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Uncertainty . . . is the only certainty there is, and knowing how to live with inse-
curity is the only security.
John Allen Paulos
1
This Article examines the symbiotic relationship between copyright law and 
technology.  I describe how an environment characterized by rapid technological 
change creates two conditions that determine the direction and evolution of 
copyright law:  legal delay and legal uncertainty.  I explain how uncertainty 
over the application of existing copyright law to newly emerging technology 
catalyzes the actions of copyright owners and users.  I argue that uncertainty 
and delay (1) have an enabling effect on anticopyright sentiments, (2) lead to a 
greater reliance on self-help efforts by content providers and users, and (3) in-
duce legislative involvement in copyright law.  In the final Part of this Article, 
I consider how the framework of technological uncertainty and delay helps to 
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explain a number of emerging issues in copyright law.  I conclude by providing 
normative proposals for copyright reform.  These proposals relate to the choice 
between standards and rules, as well as the role of courts, legislators, and ad-
ministrative agencies in the development of copyright law. 
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INTRODUCTION
Judging from the headlines, it appears that copyright law is in an 
existential crisis.2  Broadband networks and digital applications have 
widely expanded unlicensed access to copyrighted content.  Consumer-
to-consumer dissemination over file-sharing networks increasingly by-
passes traditional segments of the copyright market.  Despite the de-
ployment of a wide array of scare tactics,3 professional distributors have 
failed thus far to reverse file sharing and copyright circumvention.4
2 This Article focuses on United States copyright law, although the analysis may be 
generalized to international laws affecting copyright.  Reference is made for illustrative 
purposes as appropriate. 
3 Publishers and entertainment representatives have launched a frontal assault on 
new dissemination technologies to preserve their existing business models.  For instance, 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has pushed for legislation that 
increases copyright enforcement related to emerging technologies.  See, e.g., Piracy De-
terrence and Education Act of 2004, H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004) (enhancing copy-
right enforcement and public education about copyrights and the Internet); Author, 
Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Security (ACCOPS) Act of 2003, H.R. 
2752, 108th Cong. (2003) (extending domestic and international copyright enforce-
ment); Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (2003) (in-
cluding many of the provisions of H.R. 4077 and also clarifying the government’s author-
ity to seize pirated work).  In addition, the RIAA has filed lawsuits against technology 
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Two paradigms exist to analyze the existential crisis facing copy-
right law:  the political-economy model and the technological para-
digm.  In the political-economy model, the death of copyright law is 
caused by legislative and judicial capture by copyright owners, which 
negates the original, true meaning of copyright law.  The technologi-
cal paradigm argues that digital technology has rendered copyright 
law hopelessly obsolete or, from the entertainment industry’s view-
point, dangerously ineffective.5  Commentators argue that “digital 
copyright” requires a type of governance different from the historical 
straitjacket of copyright law.6  Interested parties disagree on the ap-
propriate direction of copyright law:  namely, does new technology 
require a stronger legal hold on copyrighted content or does digital 
technology present an opportunity to release cultural goods from the 
shackles of copyright law? 
producers, see, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (not-
ing “the recording industry’s anxiety about file-sharing”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiffs claim Napster users are engaged in 
the wholesale reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, all constituting direct 
infringement.”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are liable for both con-
tributory and vicarious copyright infringement.”), aff ’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), Internet service providers, see, e.g., In re Verizon Internet 
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the RIAA was seeking en-
forcement of subpoenas demanding the identities of copyright infringers), rev’d, 351 F.3d 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and end users of peer-to-peer networks, see infra Part I.  For an 
overview, see LexisNexis, Recording Industry Association of America Case Activity from 
Lexis/Nexis Courtlink, http://www.lexisnexis.com/trial/nalm100181clinkriaa.asp (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
4 Consider in this respect research data from the NPD Group showing that the 
number of people downloading music illegally surged a month after recording com-
panies began suing hundreds of music fans.  See Press Release, NPD Group, Peer-to-
Peer Digital Video Downloading Outpacing Legal Alternatives Five to One (Dec. 20, 
2006), available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_061220.html.  For more 
on the mixed results of these studies, see infra Part II. 
5 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-0480) 
(“Unless [developers of file-sharing software] can be held accountable, copyright will 
soon mean nothing on the Internet, and the incentives on which our copyright system 
rests will be imperiled.”).
6 See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84 (discuss-
ing the obsolescence of intellectual property law in the digital world); Jessica Litman, 
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 39 (1996) (“We can 
continue to write copyright laws that only copyright lawyers can decipher . . . or we can 
contrive a legal structure that ordinary individuals can learn . . . .”).  See generally Tom 
W. Bell, Escape from Copyright:  Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expres-
sive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 750 (2001) (“[C]lumsy attempts to legislatively am-
plify common law rights threaten to . . . do more harm than good.”). 
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With every court decision or appeal to Congress, the debate over 
the proper adjustment of copyright law becomes further polarized.7
At one end, we find the entertainment industry, while on the other 
end we have consumers, scholars, and civil libertarians.  The former 
argues that the entertainment industry will not survive unless intellec-
tual property laws are strengthened to meet the threat of new tech-
nologies and the widespread theft that occurs over the Internet.8  The 
latter maintain that new technology presents opportunities for un-
precedented cultural exchange, suggesting that existing legal and in-
stitutional arrangements reduce economic welfare by strangling tech-
nological progress.9  At regular intervals, both sides present their 
7 See, e.g., H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. sec. 1, § 514(d)(1) (2002) (exempting antipi-
racy devices from liability  where damage to a user’s computer is $250 or less); see also
Declan McCullagh, Could Hollywood Hack Your PC?, CNET NEWS, July 23, 2002, 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-945923.html?tag=fd_lede (quoting an attorney from 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation as saying that H.R. 5211 is “part of a greater strat-
egy that’s being implemented by the entertainment industry to lock up and control 
digital information”). 
8 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th 
Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (“From the advent of the player piano, every 
new means of reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright 
owners, often resulting in federal litigation.”). 
9 One argument in support of this claim is that modern communication tools en-
able the dissemination of content without significant capital investments and that the 
economic rationale for copyright’s bias towards publishers and distributors is outdated.  
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 37-38 
(2004) (arguing that new distributors may be able to harness digital distribution and 
pay a higher percentage of proceeds to artists).  Based on the assumption that digital 
sharing of music is a superior distribution mechanism, there have been several propos-
als to amend the traditional licensing model of copyright.  Many commentators would 
replace the traditional proprietary licensing model with commons or pooling ar-
rangements on the basis of mandatory levies or blanket fees.  See, e.g., WILLIAM W.
FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 199-258 (2004) (arguing for a “governmentally-
administered reward system” for copyright holders); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Crea-
tive Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 313 (2002) (arguing that artists could be compensated through statutory 
levies on Internet service subscriptions and on the sales of computer, audio, and video 
equipment); Litman, supra note 9, at 41-50 (proposing blanket fees or levies, digital 
rights management, and an opt-out mechanism for copyright); Lydia Pallas Loren, Un-
tangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 704-16 (2003) (arguing 
for a market-based solution to the problem of copyright licensing); Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., The Death of Copyright:  Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852-53 (2001) (suggesting a levy on sales of equip-
ment and blank storage media while authorizing private copying); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) (making the case for governmental use levies to force individuals 
to effectively pay for the right to copy and distribute copyrighted works). 
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arguments before the Supreme Court.10  Meanwhile, the copyright tug 
of war attains iconoclastic dimensions.11
As this description of current events illustrates, copyright law is 
greatly influenced by technological change.12  Whenever technological 
advances create new means of making copies or communicating copy-
righted works, difficult questions arise as to how boundaries should be 
drawn around new uses of content created by the new technology.13
10 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), is constitu-
tional); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (concluding that newspapers can-
not license individual articles to databases without a transfer of copyright).  The Supreme 
Court recently declined to hear an appeal by the RIAA regarding subpoenas of Internet 
service providers in In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc. 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003), 
rev’d, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004), and vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of peer-to-peer developers in Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.  See
generally Cynthia L. Webb, Supremes Quietly Change Piracy Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29254-2004Oct13.html (de-
scribing the Supreme Court’s refusal to entertain the recording industry’s arguments in 
the Verizon case).  The Court’s abstention is attributed to pending legislation, such as the 
Inducing Infringements of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004), and the 
percolation of various other cases at the lower court level.  See Ken Fisher, RIAA Given the 
Snub by Supreme Court, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 12, 2004, http://arstechnica.com/old/ 
content/2004/10/4299.ars (noting that the Supreme Court will have several upcoming 
opportunities to reconsider copyright issues). 
11 Both camps are drifting apart and increasingly reject the other’s governance 
model entirely, thus invigorating the discourse.  Protests by activist organizations such 
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, digitalconsumer.org, and publicknowledge.org 
are intensifying and increasingly speaking in terms of anarchy, “copyfights,” and mani-
festos.  See, e.g., Posting of Siva Vaidhyanathan to SIVACRACY.NET, 90% Crud:  The 
(Poor) State of Copyright Activism, http://sivacracy.net/blogarchive/2004_06_02_ 
blogarchive.html ( June 2, 2004) (“How can we have a revolution if we don’t have a 
manifesto?”).  Others, such as the copyleft movement, dismiss the copyright model al-
together.  See generally Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft:  Licensing Collaborative Works in the 
Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1997). 
12 Of course, large areas of law are also reactive to technological changes.  For in-
stance, new technologies often present new issues for tort law.  Although several obser-
vations in this Article apply equally to other instances where law and technology inter-
act, this Article focuses squarely on the copyright implications of technology that 
creates new means of copying and distributing copyrighted content. 
13 See, for example, the legal battle brought by the RIAA against Diamond Multi-
media as a result of its production of the “Rio” MP3 player.  The RIAA accused Dia-
mond of a multitude of intellectual property violations, including the production of a 
digital audio recording device that did not meet the requirements set forth by the Au-
dio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237, 4244, 
the failure to employ Serial Copyright Management System (SCMS) technology, and 
the failure to pay royalties on revenue earned from the sale of its device.  The court 
dismissed the claim, holding that general computer technology is not governed by the 
AHRA.  See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 
1072, 1075, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Despite copyright law’s historic tendency to respond to new techno-
logical developments by adjusting the scope of copyright law (continu-
ing from the printing press to digital applications), our theoretical un-
derstanding of the effects of technological changes on copyright law 
remains relatively undeveloped.  Notwithstanding the general aware-
ness of the intricate relationship between technology and copyright 
law, scholarship provides little insight into the causal dynamics be-
tween the two.  As a result, with each new technological breakthrough, 
we are confronted with difficult questions about the relationship be-
tween the new technology and copyright law.  For example, does the 
Internet present a challenge to copyright enforcement that is mostly 
related to the scale of infringements, or does it present a qualitative 
change that necessitates shifting the paradigm of copyright law?  Is it 
simply that innovation leads the way and copyright follows?  If so, can 
we understand the future of copyright law by looking ahead and an-
ticipating changes in technology?  Has technology created a paradigm 
shift in copyright law, and do current events simply exemplify the no-
tion that laws are slow at adapting to evolving social norms? 
This Article seeks to enhance our understanding of the intricate 
relationship between copyright law and technology in general and to 
examine the formative effects of technology on copyright rules in par-
ticular.  I argue that technology, by creating an environment of rapid 
and unpredictable change, establishes two major conditions that have 
a profound effect on copyright law:  legal delay and legal uncertainty. 
Legal delay is caused by the dynamic and unpredictable nature of 
technological innovation.  Delay is further amplified in a fast-changing 
technological environment because (1) uncertainty postpones the tim-
ing of lawmaking and (2) copyright law requires open-ended standards 
rather than specific rules.  As a result, the legal adaptation of copyright 
law necessarily lags behind technological change.  Legal uncertainty 
results because the general social and economic ramifications are typi-
cally unknown when a new technology is introduced.  As these ramifi-
cations become clear, the process of legal classification faces many am-
biguities and difficult issues of interpretation.  In copyright law, 
breakthrough technologies make it more difficult to apply existing 
rules by analogy.  Even when courts seek to apply the relatively bright-
line rules of copyright doctrine, the exact entitlement of rights may be 
surprisingly uncertain when applied to a novel technology. 
Uncertainty and delay impose significant societal costs.  Any vari-
ance in the assessments of how existing rules apply to a new technology 
may divert behavior away from the social optimum.  If a legal standard 
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is uncertain, some individuals may overestimate the legal constraints 
and forego beneficial actions, while others may underestimate the very 
same constraints and carry out costly actions.  Excessive compliance 
induces cultural impoverishment, especially when it causes artists to 
avoid incorporating copyrighted material even though the use might 
be considered noninfringing.  In other instances, uncertainty may in-
duce underdeterrence, leading to litigation costs and further polariza-
tion between copyright holders and users of technology. 
More fundamentally, in Part II, I explain how uncertainty and de-
lay catalyze the actions of copyright owners and users, thus providing 
insight into the formation of copyright law.  Specifically, I argue that 
uncertainty and delay (1) have an enabling effect on anticopyright 
sentiments, (2) lead to a greater reliance on self-help efforts by con-
tent providers and users, and (3) induce legislative involvement in the 
area of copyright law.  First, because technological innovation and 
new uses precede legal adaptation, technological innovation affects 
social norms.  By the time that legal issues of copyright scope are 
solved with regard to a new technology, users of that technology are 
no longer neutral bystanders.  Individuals internalize the use of a new 
technology and therefore experience loss when a previously “free” use 
is banned.  As a result, copyright enforcement is frustrated by the 
stickiness of social norms14 and the counterproductive effects that re-
sult from resisting already internalized norms.  Second, the uncer-
tainty and delay increase the reliance on self-help by both users and 
copyright owners alike.  When copyright owners feel that the law 
adapts too slowly and fails to offer adequate protection, they invest in 
antipiracy-protection technologies.15  This investment, in turn, moti-
vates users to invest in circumvention technologies, creating an arms 
race between content owners and pirates in which the very technology 
that is used to create a lock can be used to pick it.  This process leads 
to recurring lapses in enforcement and increases the polarization be-
tween the camps.  Third, the hesitation of courts to quickly adapt 
copyright law to new technology often translates into judicial defer-
14 See generally Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms?  Unauthorized Music 
Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (2005) (arguing that the re-
cording industry’s attempts to curb illegal file sharing through educational campaigns, 
lawsuits, and legislation are ineffective because of the “stickiness” of prodownloading 
social norms). 
15 For a critical examination of the effects of self-help measures, see John A. Roth-
child, The Social Costs of Technological Protection Measures, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1181, 
1198-1203 (2007).
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ence to Congress.  Legislative rulemaking in copyright law may have 
particular significance for the shaping of copyright law over time, as it 
opens the door for greater influence by interest groups.  The poten-
tial difficulty of reaching political compromise may further extend pe-
riods of legal uncertainty in copyright law.  By prolonging legal uncer-
tainty, judicial deference gives additional breathing room to the 
internalization of anticopyright norms by users and the reliance on 
self-help efforts by copyright owners. 
Part III concludes by examining normative proposals for copyright 
reform.  As I argue, the growing complexity and rate of technological 
innovation might call for a greater degree of regulatory governance in 
copyright law.  Like the potential conflict between pollution controls 
and economic growth in environmental policy, efforts to secure copy-
right protection may interfere with progress in the technology sector.  
Regulatory approaches may be better suited to balance the interests in 
promoting new technology by responding to the changing techno-
logical landscape and by balancing competing core principles, all 
while providing promise in terms of reducing uncertainty and delay. 
Together, legal uncertainty and delay present interrelated com-
plications that inhibit the enforcement of copyright law:  anticopying 
technology never accomplishes perfect protection, social norms com-
plicate enforcement efforts, and legal adaptation is slow.  An analysis 
of these intrinsic constraints provides an improved understanding of 
the enforcement problems faced by copyright law. 
I. DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law has a symbiotic relationship with technology.  Gen-
erally, new technology enables novel ways to enjoy copyrighted con-
tent, which opens new markets for artists to sell their licensed works.16
When technology creates new means of copying or communicating 
copyrighted works, difficult questions arise about the relationship be-
tween existing copyright law and the use of the copyrighted content 
made available through the new technology.17  One of the most 
16 The origin of copyright law lies in technology.  Investments in the printing press 
prompted the development of the legislation that granted the first copyrights to pub-
lishers of written works.  See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2005, at 121, 122 (noting the impact of the printing press on the development 
of England’s Copyright Act of 1709). 
17 Some describe the development of copyright law as the emergence of “awkward 
ambiguities and widening areas of legal dispute . . . created by the application to new 
technological developments of laws pertaining to . . . copyrights.”  Paul A. David, Intel-
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prominent legal issues in copyright law pertains to fair use:  does the 
new use fall within the legal category of free use, or is it within the ex-
clusive right of copyright owners and therefore in need of a license?18
As such, most pages in the history of copyright law involve drawing 
boundaries around new uses of content created by technology.  And 
so, time after time, technological advancements have affected copy-
right law by demanding answers to difficult questions regarding the 
scope of the law.  For example, is a person who stores copyrighted 
music files on her computer in publicly accessible folders liable for in-
fringing upon the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute?  Is a 
software developer vicariously liable for copyright infringement when 
it distributes technology that enables individuals to share both copy-
righted and noncopyrighted material?19  Can companies be held liable 
for selling technology that enables users to skip commercials with the 
click of a button?20  In each of these cases, courts are asked to ascer-
tain the “limits of statutory language” through judicial interpretation 
and interpolation.21  Although this basic understanding of the rela-
tionship between technology and copyright law is correct, it only goes 
so far in that it ignores important effects that result from the relation-
ship between copyright law and technological change. 
lectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb:  Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in 
Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19, 19 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993). 
18 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982) 
(“Fair use is one label courts use when they approve a user’s departure from the mar-
ket.”); see also Christopher Alan Hower, Reviving Fair Use:  Why Sony’s Expansion of Fair 
Use Sparked the File-Sharing Craze, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 75, 76-86 (2008) (discuss-
ing the application of fair use to file sharing); R. Terry Parker, Sold Downstream:  Free 
Speech, Fair Use, and Anti-Circumvention Law, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 299, 300-02 (2007) (de-
scribing fair use as a “safety valve” for free speech). 
19 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 
(2005) (requiring “clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringe-
ment” for secondary liability, not “mere knowledge of infringing potential”); A&M Re-
cords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster’s failure to 
police the system’s ‘premises,’ combined with a showing that Napster financially bene-
fits from the continuing availability of infringing files on its system, leads to the imposi-
tion of vicarious liability.”). 
20 See Ned Snow, The TiVo Question:  Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?,
56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 81 (2005) (concluding that using a digital video recorder to 
skip commercials violates copyright law and arguing that device manufacturers should 
be contributorily liable); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (permitting “time-shifting” as fair use). 
21 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 858 (1987). 
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As this Article explains, rapid technological change creates two 
major conditions that determine the direction and evolution of copy-
right law:  legal delay and legal uncertainty.  As I describe below, the 
uncertainty as to how to apply existing copyright law to emerging uses 
catalyzes the actions of copyright owners and users.  The remainder of 
this Part further discusses legal delay and legal uncertainty in copy-
right law.  Part II describes the effect that these conditions have on 
the behavior of the major stakeholders in copyright law. 
A.  Legal Delay in Copyright Law 
Technological change is characterized by a high rate of innova-
tion22 and an inherently unpredictable outcome.  The unpredictable 
path of innovation is demonstrated best by the many examples in 
which the social and economic impacts of a revolutionary technology 
were unforeseen, even by their own creators.  Famous anecdotes in-
clude the decision of the CEO of Kodak to dismiss a copying process 
brought to him by a research employee who then left and became the 
founder of Xerox,23 and the historical mistake of IBM to dismiss the 
notion of a market for home computers.24
Because innovation is rapid and unpredictable, the adaptation of 
copyright law lags far behind the introduction of new technological ad-
vancements.  Four central factors contribute to the lag that occurs when 
copyright law responds to a new technology.  First, the creation of new 
legal rules takes time.  Lawmaking is a complex process that involves 
various procedural safeguards and many different institutions and ac-
tors.  While innovation can also be the result of a long, elaborate, and 
planned process, many innovative breakthroughs are spontaneous and 
quick, such as the invention of the Post-it Note, which was accidentally 
created by a researcher attempting to develop a durable bonding 
22 In the computing field, the rapid pace of innovation is said to be governed by 
Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors that may be placed on an in-
tegrated circuit grows exponentially and doubles approximately every two years.  It has 
become a general signpost of the speed of technological progress.  See Gordon E. 
Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, 
at 114, available at http://download.intel.com/research/silicon/moorespaper.pdf. 
23 Karen Garst, Our Paradigm Shift, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1998, at 47, 51. 
24 See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:  The Case 
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 86 n.41 (1994) (noting that IBM initially re-
garded computers as having only scientific applications). 
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agent.25  Especially in the age of digital technology, where the distribu-
tion of innovative products does not necessarily require elaborate plan-
ning and financial investment,26 the gap widens between the application 
of innovation and the consolidation of its copyright legal status. 
Second, the dynamic and unpredictable nature of technological 
innovation makes it difficult for lawmakers to predict or anticipate 
forthcoming inventions.  In other words, it is difficult to reduce delay 
by writing copyright laws to anticipate coming trends, especially since 
past innovations are not always reliable indicators of what is to come.27
This fact complicates efforts to reduce legal delay by acting proactively. 
Third, the unpredictability of innovation necessitates the deploy-
ment of open-ended standards in copyright law.  While such rules re-
duce error costs and enable copyright decision makers to be more 
flexible, these open-ended standards increase the amount of decision 
making at the judicial level,28 which further contributes to legal delay. 
Finally, the initial ambiguity as to the potential social and eco-
nomic implications of a novel technology is the fourth contributing 
factor to legal delay in copyright.  Often, the implications of novel 
uses of copyrighted content only materialize in the minds of copyright 
owners once the use has already become widespread and visible.29  It 
must first become apparent that the use of novel technology entails 
substantial opportunity costs to producers—that is, that there are 
“gains to be internalized.”30  The initial ambiguity of the socioeco-
nomic implications of a new technology can be illustrated, for exam-
25 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Nonobviousness:  A Comment on Three Learned Pa-
pers, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 431, 439 (2008). 
26 See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369, 400-15 (2002) (discussing open-source software and peer production). 
27 For example, the introduction of the audio tape presented no indication to 
lawmakers of a future in which all content would be playable in digital formats.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that the AHRA did not account for such a change and thus be-
came virtually obsolete after the court in Diamond stated that a computer hard drive is 
not within the meaning of a “digital audio recording device.”  See Recording Indus. 
Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).  See generally
Nika Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the Music Industry,
2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001, at 5, http://bciptf.org/index.php?option= 
com_content&task=view&id=30. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 82-87. 
29 Historically, copyright owners have always tolerated minor infringements.  See
generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law:  A History, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007). 
30 On the evolution of intellectual property rights, see Ben Depoorter, The Several 
Lives of Mickey Mouse:  The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 34-41 (2004).
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ple, by peer-to-peer music exchanges.  The music industry discovered 
that huge profits could be made by delivering music in a compressed 
format (MP3) only after such exchanges were already relatively com-
mon.31  More than a year passed between the introduction of Napster, 
the widely used file-sharing application, and the onset of litigation by 
the recording industry.32  Only when the opportunity costs of unregu-
lated use become apparent will copyright owners seek the expansion 
of copyright law through litigation and legislation.33  While copyright 
owners seek to extend the reach of intellectual property laws so that 
they include emerging technological applications, both copyright 
owners and users of new technologies operate in a vacuum of consid-
erable legal uncertainty. 
To illustrate legal uncertainty, Table 1 provides an overview of ten 
major innovative breakthroughs that gave rise to copyright issues.  
The two columns on the left indicate the type of technology and the 
year that it was introduced.  The three columns on the right indicate 
the final resolution of the main copyright questions (either by way of 
judicial decision or new legislation), the year of the decision, and the 
number of years between the introduction of the technology and the 
final outcome of the legal issue.  As can be concluded from the table, 
the average time that it takes to ascertain an innovation’s copyright 
status is approximately seven years and two months.34
31 See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 99 (2002) (“Even with the introduction and rapid popularity of digitally-
encoded compact disks (CDs) and the proliferation of microcomputers beginning in 
the early 1980s, the record industry did not appreciate the dramatic changes that 
would be brought about by the emerging digital technologies.”). 
32 Napster counted 26.4 million users as of February 2001.  See Press Release, Jupi-
ter Media Metrix, Global Napster Usage Plummets but New File-Sharing Alternatives 
Gaining Ground, Reports Jupiter Media Metrix ( July 20, 2001), available at
http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?id=249. 
33 Jane Ginsburg colorfully describes this first formal step in the expansion of copy-
right law as copyright holders’ “Pavlovian” response to new technology.  Jane C. Gins-
burg, Essay, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 66 (2002). 
34 Legal delay was calculated for copyright issues involving the following innova-
tions:  the cassette tape, the VCR, the CD, the digital audio tape (DAT), the DVD, Bul-
letin Board System (BBS) boards, the MP3 format, the Rio, centralized file-sharing 
software (Napster), and decentralized file-sharing software (Grokster).  Some innova-
tions created multiple copyright issues, leading to multiple decisions made by courts at 
different times.  Most cases, however, involved a similar question:  whether the new 
technology’s novel means of sharing or distributing copyrighted content fell within the 
bundle of rights held by copyright owners.  Note that the calculations in Table 1 serve 
merely to illustrate legal delay and to give a sense of the average length of the copy-
right adaptation period.  Individual differences between cases may largely depend on 
factors unrelated to technology.  For instance, individual differences in time between 
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Table 1:  Average Legal Delay 
Technology 
Year  
Introduced Legal Resolution 
Year 
Resolved 
Years 
Elapsed 
Audio  
Cassette
1963 Sound Recording Amendment 
of 197135
1971 8 
VCR 1972 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.36
1984 12 
CD 1982 Audio Home Recording Act of 
199237
1992 10
DAT 1986 Audio Home Recording Act of 
199238
1992 6 
DVD 1996 DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner39 2004 8 
BBS Boards 1979 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena40 1993 14 
MP3 Format 1993 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 
Inc.41
2000 7 
Diamond Rio 1998 Recording Industry Ass’n of America 
v. Diamond Multimedia Systems42
1999 1 
Napster 1999 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc.43
2001 2 
Grokster 2001 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd.44
2005 4 
innovation and legal adaptation may likely be influenced by changes in procedural 
laws that have taken place between the various cases. 
35 Pub. L. No. 92-140, sec. 2, § 101(e), 85 Stat. 391, 392 (“[D]iscs or tapes for use 
in mechanical music-producing machines adapted to reproduce copyright musical 
works, shall be considered copies of the copyrighted musical works . . . .”). 
36 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that Sony’s sale of Betamax equipment did 
not constitute contributory negligence). 
37 Pub. L. No. 102-563, sec. 2, § 1008, 106 Stat. 4237, 4244 (“No action may be 
brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, 
importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device . . . or based on the 
noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device . . . .”). 
38 Id.
39 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 196 (Ct. App. 2004) (concluding on remand that the issu-
ance of an injunction prohibiting the distribution of DVD-decoding software was an 
abuse of discretion). 
40 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that the bulletin board 
infringed Playboy’s exclusive rights of display and public distribution, and that fair use 
did not apply). 
41 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that defendant’s online posting of 
MP3 files for access by individuals who could prove that they owned a CD copy was not 
protected fair use). 
42 180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying, on appeal, the RIAA’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction, because the Rio is unable to make copies from transmissions). 
43 239 F.3d 1004, 121-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster had sufficient 
knowledge of the availability of infringing material to impose contributory and vicari-
ous liability). 
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It is important to note, however, that legal delay can sometimes be 
justified.  Properly conceived, lawmaking is similar to an investment 
decision in that timing is of the essence.45  In this sense, at any given 
time there are both costs and benefits to changing the law.  Acting too 
rapidly creates the risk that the new rule will be premature.  Doing so 
will likely increase error costs, as the rules will be ill-suited to govern 
the future of the developing relationship between technological inno-
vations and copyrighted materials.  By contrast, waiting may lead to 
increased future benefits by enabling legislation that is better adjusted 
to the new technology.46  On the other hand, waiting increases legal 
uncertainty and postpones the realization of any short-term gains that 
result when a legal rule is tailored to the most recent developments.  
Therefore, to strike a balance, lawmakers should consider the oppor-
tunity costs of immediate investments in new legal rules in addition to 
the potential benefits of waiting. 
There are a number of reasons that some delay in copyright law 
might be favorable.  As mentioned earlier, the field of copyright law is 
heavily influenced by underlying technology.47  Because technological 
cycles of innovative products are highly unpredictable,48 there is a real 
44 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (holding that distributing software with manifest 
intent to promote copyright infringement can render the software’s distributor liable 
for the infringing actions of third parties). 
45 Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, Legislate Today or Wait Until Tomorrow?  An Invest-
ment Approach to Law Making, 23 J. PUB. FIN. & PUB. CHOICE 19 (2006).  As with regular 
investments in assets, lawmaking decisions involve a degree of (1) irreversibility, (2) 
uncertainty over future returns, and (3) discretion with regard to the timing of those 
investments.
46 Id.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 16-21. 
48 Although there is considerable debate regarding the causes of innovation, it 
may suffice to note that the technological cycle of an innovative product is highly un-
predictable.  For instance, technological innovation is only partially susceptible to ex-
ternal influence.  Although it is widely recognized that market forces help shape the 
course of innovation, scholars recognize that innovation also runs an independent 
course.  On the former position, see generally Jacob Schmookler, Economic Sources of 
Inventive Activity, J. ECON. HIST., Mar. 1962, at 1.  Evidence in support of the theory of 
technological opportunity suggests that markets often follow innovations, and not vice 
versa.  See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(Redvers Opie trans., 1934); F.M. Scherer, Demand-Pull and Technological Invention:  
Schmookler Revisited, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 225 (1982). This is known as the debate on 
technology demand-pull versus technology opportunism.  For an overview of empirical 
work on whether social and economic conditions drive innovation or whether societal 
economic forces trace independent innovation, see Thomas B. Åstebro & Kristina B. 
Dahlin, Opportunity Knocks, 34 RES. POL’Y 1404 (2005). 
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likelihood that the value of a new copyright regulation will increase 
over time.49  First, because copyright law is a field dominated by rap-
idly changing technology, any newly adopted rule might prove to be 
ineffective or rendered obsolete as a technology becomes outdated or 
is replaced by new innovation.50  Second, technological changes have 
rapid growth rates along paths that are notoriously difficult to predict 
ahead of time.  This unpredictability increases the benefits of delaying 
final judgment until the ramifications of a new technology can be as-
certained with some confidence.  Third, lawmaking involves costs, 
such as those created by learning and rewriting statutes.  Fourth, any 
potential mistake is likely to be very costly given the economic and 
cultural impact of copyright industries.51
One possible drawback to waiting is that it forgoes any potential 
benefits that could be gained from legal experimentation.  By awaiting 
further developments, the legal system loses the opportunity to inter-
vene and possibly produce socially desired effects.  In the field of 
technology, however, it is often said that technological maturation is a 
process that runs its own course.  Legal experimentation in this proc-
ess might simply delay maturation of the technology and the revela-
tion of its true social and economic impact.52  Moreover, early legal in-
tervention might affect the course of technological change, a 
potentially irreversible consequence. 
Contrary to contemporary legal scholarship, which has mostly ne-
glected the value of waiting, courts often recognize the value of defer-
49 See Francesco Parisi et al., The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, 18 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 131, 134 (2004) (U.K.) (arguing that adopting a law is akin to investing in that 
the value of the law depends on its discounted future benefits). 
50 Consider, for instance, how the Audio Home Recording Act became virtually ob-
solete with the emergence of personal home computers after the court in Diamond held 
that a computer’s hard drive is not a “digital audio recording device” under the Act be-
cause audio recording is not the personal computer’s “primary purpose.”  Recording 
Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). 
51 In 2001, copyright industries (including those involved in movies, television 
programs, home videos, business and entertainment software, books, and music and 
sound recordings) contributed an estimated $535.1 billion to the U.S. economy, ac-
counting for approximately 5.24% of GDP.  STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2002 REPORT 3 (2002), available at http:// 
www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEK_FULL.pdf.  On the role of copyright in the American 
economy, see the sources cited in Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 61 n.1.  A similar trend 
emerges on a global scale.  See generally OECD, THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: A
SET OF FACTS AND FIGURES (1999). 
52 See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 27, at 5 (“[W]hile the DAT machine was released in 
1986, . . . the threat of litigation prevented the machines from entering the market for 
nearly seven years.”). 
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ring final judgment until technology matures or until the direction of 
technological change becomes apparent.53  For instance, in Grokster,
Judge Thomas cautioned against steadfast legal adaptation in times of 
rapid technological change: 
[A]s we have observed, we live in a quicksilver technological environ-
ment with courts ill-suited to fix the flow of internet innovation.  The in-
troduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and 
particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through 
well-established distribution mechanisms.  Yet, history has shown that 
time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests, 
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, 
a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 
player.  Thus, it is prudent for courts to exercise caution before restruc-
turing liability theories for the purpose of addressing specific market 
abuses, despite their apparent present magnitude.
54
As will be discussed further, courts’ hesitance to quickly adapt 
copyright law to new technology shifts the timing decision to the legis-
lative branch, which may result in additional delay.  The ripple effects 
of legal delay are explored in further detail in Part II.  First, however, I 
examine the second condition of copyright formation with regard to 
technology:  legal uncertainty.
B. Legal Uncertainty 
When a new technology that enables novel uses of copyrighted 
content is introduced, its social and economic ramifications are still 
generally unknown.  These ramifications, however, become clear soon 
afterwards, and the process of legally classifying the novel uses must 
begin.  When attempting to apply existing copyright laws to new tech-
nological developments, many ambiguities and difficult issues of in-
terpretation emerge.  Thus, the introduction of a new technology is 
always followed by a period of legal uncertainty in copyright law. 
What I mean by legal uncertainty is the difficulty of perfectly pre-
dicting ex ante how the courts will apply the law to new circumstances 
53 See, e.g., Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 
2000).  Judge Calabresi, writing for a unanimous panel, delayed his decision, awaiting 
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), which would eventually be-
come effective while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.  Id. at 496-97.  
The ACPA resolved most issues surrounding the allocation of domain names involving 
cybersquatting.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
54 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 
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ex post.55  In a broader sense, legal uncertainty may also refer to the 
difficulty of perfectly predicting ex ante how courts or legislators will 
categorize actions in new statutes.56  By contrast, legal certainty refers 
to a condition in which a legal system is presumed to be without any 
gaps.  In such instances, abstract laws can be seamlessly applied to 
concrete cases by way of logic, and all conduct can thus be accurately 
categorized as either complying with or violating the law.57
Of course, legal uncertainty pervades all areas of the law.58  Some 
argue that the law is so inherently indeterminate that authoritative le-
gal texts and judicial precedents generally permit multiple answers to 
lawsuits.59  Still, while many areas of law adjust to gradually evolving 
social and macroeconomic changes, copyright law constantly needs to 
respond to issues raised by technological advances that are often more 
erratic and more difficult to predict.  Also, many of the legal ambigui-
ties created by novel technologies go to the very heart of the balance 
of rights in copyright law, such as issues of copyright subject matter, 
the scope of rights, and the boundaries of the public domain.  For in-
stance, new technology regularly poses fundamental questions of 
definition, such as “is this a copy?”60
55 Note that there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty.  Individuals are sub-
ject to risk if (1) an event may or may not happen in the future, and (2) the chance that 
the event will happen is known.  By contrast, an event is uncertain if (1) it may or may 
not happen in the future, and (2) we do not know the chances that it will happen.  See 
generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
56 A more precise, but also more limiting, definition of uncertainty pertains to 
situations where a given act is “said by informed attorneys to have an expected official 
outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability.”  Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). 
57 MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward 
Shils trans., 1954). 
58 See generally D’Amato, supra note 56 (describing a trend toward greater uncer-
tainty); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (examining the optimal level of precision for rules and stan-
dards); Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law’s Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV.
1233 (1974) (discussing considerations involved in, and obstacles to, reducing uncer-
tainty); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process:  An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (1991) (examining how rules and bal-
ancing approaches evolve out of litigation). 
59 For a critique of this strand of thought, which is most prevalent in the area of 
critical legal studies, see Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989). 
60 Consider how the questions of copyright and fair use with regard to peer-to-
peer networks resemble a hypothetical scenario in which a new technology (for in-
stance, low-air travel with jet packs) would allow new ways of trespassing over real 
property boundaries.  To understand the major effect of technology on copyright law, 
imagine further that millions of people would be engaging in such acts of trespass 
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Moreover, technological breakthroughs, by their nature, make it 
more difficult to apply existing rules by analogy.  The legal struggle 
over the sharing of music on peer-to-peer networks illustrates the un-
expected ambiguities that are regularly presented by new technology.  
The introduction of file-sharing software, high-level bandwidth access 
to the Internet, and advanced compression technology vastly ex-
panded individuals’ opportunities to exchange music. 
As a result of these combined advancements, the sharing of copy-
righted content began to occur on an unprecedented scale, creating 
many difficult questions about the potential liability for copyright in-
fringement on behalf of intermediaries (the creators of peer-to-peer 
software and Internet service providers) and end users.  Specifically, 
file sharing challenged the boundaries of noncommercial music bor-
rowing.  On the one hand, peer-to-peer file-sharing activities are very 
different from the conventional notion of piracy:  infringements lack 
a commercial purpose, there are no conventional intermediaries, and 
the technology has applications that are clearly noninfringing.  On 
the other hand, because of the scale of online music sharing and its 
alleged negative effect on entertainment-industry profits,61 it became 
obvious that file sharing could not be treated as analogous to sharing 
music among friends—a practice traditionally tolerated by copyright 
holders.  Despite many years of intense litigation over the legal conse-
quences of peer-to-peer technology, many copyright questions remain 
unresolved.62
An important consideration, the consequences of which I will ad-
dress in more detail,63 is that new technologies often present so much 
while courts were debating whether the new technology amounted to trespass and 
whether property owners were allowed to prevent such encroachments.  Although such 
definitional cases are certainly not unheard of in areas such as property law, they are 
few and far between.  For example, mass air travel created the legal issue of whether 
individual landowners can prevent airlines from flying over their property.  See United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (concluding that federal statutes create a 
public highway above certain altitudes). 
61 See Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing:  Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006) (identifying file sharing as the cause of declining record sales); 
see also RIAA, For Students Doing Reports, http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2009) (“One credible analysis by the Institute for Policy Innovation concludes 
that global music piracy causes $12.5 billion of economic losses every year, 71,060 U.S. 
jobs lost, a loss of $2.7 billion in workers’ earnings, and a loss of $422 million in tax 
revenues, $291 million in personal income tax and $131 million in lost corporate in-
come and production taxes.”). 
62 For a review of various current issues, see generally Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, http://www.eff.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
63 See infra Section II.A. 
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legal ambiguity that (self-serving) users of the technology deem the 
novel uses to be noninfringing under their own understandings of 
copyright law. 
To further illustrate the considerable uncertainty in copyright law, 
consider the sequence, timing, and outcome of the litigation in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.  It took almost five years to 
establish that developers of decentralized peer-to-peer technology 
could be held vicariously liable for copyright infringements on their 
networks.64  Moreover, prior to the Supreme Court’s development of 
the “inducement” theory in Grokster, both the trial court and the Ninth 
Circuit had firmly decided that developers of decentralized peer-to-
peer technology could not be held accountable under existing copy-
right law.65  Thus, in a period of five years, the legal status of decen-
tralized file sharing shifted entirely. 
Generally, during periods of uncertainty, copyright holders and 
users of new technology assume either that (1) the new technology is 
encompassed by the current intellectual property laws (by relying on 
analogy or precedent) or (2) the new technology is sufficiently differ-
ent from existing technology that analogy is not warranted (the dif-
ferentiation position).  As we will see below, an individual’s normative 
beliefs and viewpoints about the purpose of copyright law are likely to 
influence the position that she takes while awaiting judicially or legis-
latively established certainty. 
II. THE BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY
As outlined above, the inherent uncertainty surrounding a tech-
nological innovation may delay the adjustment of existing laws.  Such 
delays engender considerable uncertainty as to the legal status of the 
developing uses of copyrighted content created by the new technol-
ogy.  In this Part, I outline the various actions that are set in motion by 
legal uncertainty and delay. 
64 The complaint was filed on October 2, 2001.  See Complaint for Damages and 
Injunctive Relief for Copyright Infringement, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-8541).  The Supreme 
Court reached its decision on June 27, 2005.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  Final disposition on remand did not occur until 
September 27, 2006.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 
2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  This chronology does not include the litigation that is now 
taking place to establish the boundaries and precise meaning of the “inducement” 
theory established by the Supreme Court. 
65 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32, aff ’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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A.  The Emergence of Anticopyright Norms 
Most revolutionary technological advances are followed by periods 
of uncertainty about how existing copyright law applies to the new 
technology.  As described in Section I.A., the resolution of emerging 
issues in copyright law takes time, and difficult questions need to be 
answered before any official changes can or should take place.  Those 
making the legal adjustments must consider the timing of lawmaking.  
On top of that, it takes time to move matters through the adjudicative 
or legislative process. 
During this time, the application of copyright principles to new 
technology is highly uncertain.  As a factual matter, however, new 
technological uses of content often proceed in settings where there is 
little to no enforcement of copyright law.  Take, for instance, the 
sphere of open-access file sharing that users of Napster enjoyed in the 
initial years.  Legal action against the developers of Napster and its us-
ers lagged because it was not immediately obvious to copyright hold-
ers that peer-to-peer file sharing would become widespread.  Even 
when the impact of file sharing began to become clear, enforcement 
remained virtually nonexistent because any legal action undertaken by 
the music industry awaited judicial validation—that is, a judicial de-
termination regarding copyright law’s relation to the new technology. 
How do such conditions of ambiguity affect the behavior of the 
new technology’s users?  Sometimes uncertainty will induce risk-averse 
behavior.  Directors of independent movies or budget documentaries, 
for instance, are likely to apply for licenses for small segments or to 
remove content if it is uncertain whether the fair use doctrine ap-
plies.66  If there is any chance of incurring liability on the basis of 
copyright infringement, there might simply be too much to lose (and 
too little to gain) from using a small amount of copyrighted content. 
But uncertainty might also lead individuals to proceed on the as-
sumption that a novel technological use does not constitute copyright 
infringement.  Legal uncertainty may induce this default reaction in 
the following manner.  First, as commentators have noted, “legal un-
certainty can lead to inefficient risk seeking behavior.”67  Second, 
66 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 884, 896-99 (2007) (arguing that a “[b]etter safe than sued” mentality leads 
to customary licensing practices, which ultimately find their way into legal doctrine). 
67 Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1193, 1240 (1994); see also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Un-
certainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984) (analyzing 
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when facing a certain (low) probability of enforcement, as when 
downloading music on a peer-to-peer network, legal uncertainty fur-
ther discounts this initial probability because there is some chance 
that the alleged illegal activity will in fact not be deemed copyright in-
fringement by courts at a later stage.  This additional reduction of the 
probability of effective enforcement might tip the balance well in fa-
vor of downloading—even for individuals who are not disposed to 
take risks.  Third, new technologies may create enough legal ambigu-
ity that, in the minds of (self-serving) users of the technology, such 
novel uses are considered noninfringing.  Even if the issues are rela-
tively clean-cut for legal experts, there may be enough latitude for lay-
persons to develop self-serving interpretations of copyright rules as 
applied to the new technology. 
Psychological theories provide insight into the behavioral effects 
of uncertainty on individuals.68  These findings highlight individuals’ 
inclinations to construe facts in ways that align with their own precon-
ceptions.69  And, as cognitive psychology demonstrates, many personal 
beliefs originate in self-interested behavior.  For instance, the benefits 
derived from freely downloading music online can easily lead to a 
normative belief that file sharing should be legal.  File sharers might 
therefore engage in self-interested norm adjustments as a type of self-
serving bias (e.g., “I want to download music, so I think prohibiting 
peer-to-peer activities is unjust”).70  Similarly, a recent study on tax 
avoidance found that individuals “adjust their own beliefs so as to jus-
tify their behavior as right and ethical.  They then generalize these 
“ways in which uncertainty about the application of legal standards can give parties 
economic incentives to ‘overcomply’ or to ‘undercomply’—that is, to modify their be-
havior to a greater or lesser extent than a legal rule requires”).  For more details, see 
infra Section III.A. 
68 See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:  
The Role Of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111-13 (1997).  The authors 
assigned participants in a study to be either the plaintiff or the defendant in a tort case 
regarding a car accident with a maximum potential damages payment of $100,000.  
The plaintiffs’ prediction of the likely judicial award was on average $14,500 higher 
than the defendants’.  The plaintiffs’ suggestion of a ‘fair’ figure was $17,700 higher 
than the defendants’.  Id.
69 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural The-
ory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1314-15 (2003) (stating that when 
an individual is presented with “competing factual claims,” she is most likely to accept 
those proposed by individuals “who share [her] cultural outlooks”). 
70 See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Porgarsky, An Experimental Investigation of Deterrence:  
Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167, 171 (2003) (“[S]elf-
serving bias [is] the tendency for individuals to shade judgments in a manner favorable 
to themselves.”). 
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views to others, presumably to gain further social support.”71  Current 
research on the causality of norms and behavior sheds insight into 
possible underlying psychological processes.  According to the theory 
of cognitive dissonance, when humans 
sense something in the world that is inconsistent with the cognitive 
frame through which we see the world, we initially (unconsciously) ig-
nore or distort our perception.  If that becomes impossible, we eventu-
ally amend our cognitive frame (i.e., the way we see and understand the 
world) to incorporate our new perception.
72
When file sharers notice that file sharing is pursued in courts, it 
might not correspond with their view of the world, and therefore they 
might ignore copyright litigation for some time.  Despite the obvious 
self-interested origin of such anticopyright norms, “people assert that 
interests have nothing to do with their behavior in following various 
norms.”73  As I will discuss in more detail, such ex post rationaliza-
tions of self-interested anticopyright conduct have important policy 
implications. 
An interesting indirect effect of uncertainty and delay thus relates 
to the enabling effect that it has on copyright social norms.  By the 
time that legal questions of copyright scope are solved with regard to 
new technologies, users of the new technology are no longer neutral 
bystanders.  The time between a perceived free use of technology and 
the determination of its legal status allows for individuals to get accus-
tomed to the use of a new technology.  This effect likely affects the 
preferences and behavior of users in at least two ways.  First, after a 
certain period of time, the evaluation of one’s behavior is internal-
ized.74  As a result of this process of norm internalization, the norm 
becomes more robust and presents a more ardent challenge to legal 
enforcement efforts.75
71 Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalisation?  Causal Relations Between Ethics, 
Norms, and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491 (2005).  In this pioneering study 
on tax evasion, Wenzel observes “bi-directional causality between ethics/norms and 
compliance.”  Id. at 504.  He concludes that, for taxpayers, tax-evasion conduct feeds 
back into personal and social norms.  Id.
72 Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes:  Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How 
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 201 n.113 (1996). 
73 Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821, 1831 (2000). 
74 On the internalization of social norms, see generally Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws 
Make Good Citizens?  An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). 
75 See Neri, supra note 14, at 748 (“[P]eople’s behavior generally conforms more 
closely with internalized social norms regarding how people should behave than with 
laws dictating behavior . . . .”).
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Second, users of new technology might experience loss when the 
previously “free” access to content made available by the new technol-
ogy is suddenly subject to licensing fees or obstructed altogether.76
The endowment effect might further affect the sentiments of users of 
that technology.77  Research shows that individuals value something 
that they lose after possessing more than they would value the exact 
same thing if they had never possessed it at all.  The self-serving per-
ception of free use, as enabled by uncertainty and delay, may thus 
amplify norm effects in copyright law. 
Indeed, several studies have documented the emergence of an an-
ticopyright culture.78  It is well settled that file sharing, for instance, has 
an overwhelmingly strong normative component.79  Many users of 
peer-to-peer applications operate under a metanorm that file-sharing 
technology is wealth maximizing and that copyright law is outdated or 
biased towards music publishers.80  Data show that norms among young 
people between the ages of thirteen and seventeen are strikingly anti-
76 This brings to mind the famous statement of Attorney General Robert Kennedy 
that “the poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend.  For him the law is 
always taking something away.”  Robert Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,  Address at the 
University of Chicago, May 1, 1964, quoted in Hirsch, supra note 58, at 1247. 
77 This effect is compounded by inherent product uncertainty in content 
industries.  As one commentator noted, “one of the reasons that business people in 
Hollywood are so nervous is that they never really know what’s going to win or what’s 
going to lose.”  Posting of Paul Schmelzer to Eyeteeth:  A Journal of Incisive Ideas, The 
Anarchist in the Library:  Discussing Cultural Democracy with Siva Vaidhyanathan, 
http://eyeteeth.blogspot.com/2003/04/anarchist-in-library-discussing.html (Apr. 21, 
2003).
78 These studies have also documented the strong norm component of download-
ing and file sharing.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms:  Towards a 
Liability Regime for File-Sharing 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 51 (2004) (noting that legal 
changes in copyright clashed with the social norms at play in online music sharing); 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on 
the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 549 (2003) (discussing how computer 
code may solve collective action problems).  The definition of “social norm” is 
somewhat elusive.  For the purpose at hand we side with the notion that a social norm 
is a social regularity, a behavior that is widely adopted in society.  Social norms, 
however, are not merely what people do; they also correspond with a conception 
within society, or a subgroup thereof, of what people should do.  See Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350-51 
(1997) (offering a definition of “norm”). 
79 See Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 577, 605-12 (2006) (examining how the creation of new laws influences 
both social norms and the social perception of illegal downloading). 
80 See Ku, supra note 9, at 268 (“The economics of digital technology also suggests 
that the exclusive rights created by copyright are inconsistent with society’s interest in 
promoting the creation of new music and making music widely available to the public.”). 
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copyright.  Prior to the RIAA’s heavily publicized lawsuits against con-
sumers for illegal downloading, only twenty percent of teenagers under 
the age of seventeen believed that it was “wrong” to download a song 
without permission from the author, compared to forty-eight percent 
of individuals between thirty-five and fifty-four and sixty-three percent 
of individuals over fifty-five years old.81  These internalized norms have 
created significant obstacles to copyright enforcement. In recognizing 
the robustness of these anticopyright norms and the difficulties ex-
perienced in trying to change such norms, scholars have increasingly 
suggested that social norms have tipped so far in favor of file sharing 
that old business models are now outdated and must be replaced with 
models built specifically around file-sharing norms.82
B. Copyright Self-Help 
A second effect of uncertainty and delay relates to the emergence 
of a technological arms race between content holders and developers 
of information technology.  When copyright holders feel that legal ad-
aptation to technological developments is too slow or inadequate to 
offer them protection, they are likely to take matters into their own 
hands.  The uncertainty and delay of enforcement is thus likely to in-
crease reliance on self-help by both users and copyright owners alike. 
Specifically in the field of digital music and movie content, copy-
right holders have included structural blocks within their content to 
physically stop end users’ infringement.83  For instance, at the begin-
ning of the digital revolution, some publishers felt so strongly that the 
law left them vulnerable that they threatened to withhold the release 
81 Press Release, E-Poll, E-Poll Study Looks at Consumers [sic] Attitudes Before and 
After RIAA Lawsuits (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-04-2003/0002050963&EDATE.  Even 
after the lawsuits, slightly less than one-third of teenagers thought that downloading mu-
sic was “wrong.”  Id.
82 See Robert C. Piasentin, Unlawful?  Innovative?  Unstoppable?  A Comparative Analy-
sis of the Potential Legal Liability Facing P2P End-Users in the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Canada, 14 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 195, 198 (2006) (arguing that striking a bal-
ance between the wants of both end users and copyright owners is the most effective 
means of regulating file sharing).
83 See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 703 (2006) (contending that improving copy protection to make 
illegal downloading more difficult will curb behavior, and will thus shape social 
norms—a task that the “fiat-only regime” is too weak to accomplish.). 
2009 Technology and Uncertainty 1855
of their products in digital formats until digital-rights-management 
tools could be secured against circumvention.84
As sophisticated prevention technology became more effective, 
however, the development of devices capable of circumventing the 
protection measures quickly followed.  As of today, no technology has 
proven to be terribly effective at preventing copying.  In most in-
stances, the very technology that is used to create a digital lock can be 
used to pick (“hack”) that lock.85  The circumvention of DVD Content 
Scrambling Systems, RealNetworks’s streaming protection measures, 
Adobe’s eBook reader, and the security code of the Xbox game con-
sole illustrate that for every enhancement in technological protection 
of intellectual property, some specialist will be able to circumvent that 
technology.86
This process resembles an arms race between content providers 
and hackers.87  At different intervals in the encryption-decryption arms 
race, one camp is ahead while the other is playing catch-up.  The cy-
clical nature of the technological struggle for control of digital con-
tent thus creates voids in the enforcement of copyright law. 
Overall, this process contributes to the problem of enforcement 
by increasing the costs of both owners and users and by generating 
84 The passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998), provided some peace of mind for those publishers who 
held significant doubt about the future.  For a detailed look at the Act’s provisions, see 
generally David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673 (2000).
85 See Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age:  Is the Marketplace 
Working to Protect Digital Creative Works?  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 89-92 (2002) (testimony of Edward W. Felten, Associate Professor of Computer 
Science, Princeton University). 
86 See Menell, supra note 31, at 178-79.  The most embarrassing illustration that 
every lock can be picked is the faltering of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).  
The SDMI held a competition for hackers, testing their ability to crack the latest anti-
circumvention technology, the digital watermark.  Edward Felten, an expert in com-
puter science, accepted the offer and successfully cracked the protection technology.  
He drafted his findings in a paper that he planned to present until he was threatened 
with a lawsuit by the SDMI.  Felten fired back with his own lawsuit requesting a declara-
tory judgment, which was subsequently dismissed.  Felten finally went forward with the 
presentation of his paper after he received assurance from the Justice Department that 
the threats of a DMCA violation were invalid.  See FISHER, supra note 9, at 96-97. 
87 See, e.g., Press Release, Steve Jobs, Apple Inc., Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), 
available at http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic (“It is a cat-and-mouse 
game.”); see also Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917, 
932-37 (2006) (exploring the relationship between the technological arms race and 
copyright law and addressing the options available to content providers who wish to 
exclude consumers from their expressive assets). 
1856 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1831
further polarization between the two camps.  Uncertainty and delay 
provide fertile ground for the politically charged environment in 
copyright law. 
C. Copyright and Congress 
Given the fast-changing and unpredictable nature of technology, 
courts are sometimes confronted with legal disputes about technology 
that has not fully matured.  In those instances, judges may not always 
feel comfortable providing a final judgment, given the ambiguous 
copyright implications of the developing technology.88  It might simply 
be too difficult for the judge to align the goals of copyright law with 
an emerging technology, particularly if the social and economic re-
percussions are not fully clear.  There is also the chance that a prema-
ture ruling may adversely interfere with the development of the tech-
nology.89  For that reason, courts may defer judgment on the copyright 
status of new technology.  Although courts are compelled by law to 
provide judgment in every case, there are various ways in which courts 
can decide a dispute while reserving judgment on the broader issue.  
For instance, a judge can limit the reach of the ruling by reducing the 
scope of the holding or limiting the breadth of the ruling. 
As indicated in the previous Section, courts frequently defer their 
decisions on the copyright status of new technology by including lan-
guage that transfers accountability to the legislature.  The standard 
formulation of this disposition  appears in the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion in Sony-Betamax.90  The Court spoke quite clearly about Congress’s 
role in applying copyright law to new technology:  “The direction of 
Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts.  When, as here, the Constitution is permis-
sive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from 
88 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The history of the Internet is a chronicle of innovation by improvisation, from its 
genesis as a national defense research network, to a medium of academic exchange, to 
a hacker cyber-subculture, to the commercial engine for the so-called ‘New Economy.’  
Like Heraclitus at the river, we address the Internet aware that courts are ill-suited to 
fix its flow . . . .”). 
89 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 955 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing the importance of permitting software with 
substantial noninfringing uses for the protection of the development of technology). 
90 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1983). 
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Congress.”91  Similarly, the Court’s decision in Grokster illustrates an ex-
ample of judicial deference in copyright law.  In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Breyer perhaps best formulated the position in favor of ju-
dicial deference in copyright law:  “[A]s Sony recognized, the legislative 
option remains available.  Courts are less well suited than Congress to 
the task of ‘accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of compet-
ing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.’”92
By inducing judicial deference, technological uncertainty thus 
contributes to the significant level of legislative rulemaking in copy-
right law.  Empirical evidence supports the notion that legislative 
rulemaking in copyright law is more prevalent than judicial decision 
making.  For instance, a study conducted by William Landes and 
Richard Posner concludes that the history of copyright law includes 
more legislative changes than does any other field of intellectual 
property law.93  It also found that the average length of legislative 
documents in copyright law is substantially longer than that of similar 
acts in other areas of intellectual property law.  In a recent study, 
Clarisa Long similarly discovered that legislative activity, measured 
over a range of indicators such as the number of amicus briefs, is 
more intense in copyright law than other fields.94
The fact that legislative rulemaking overshadows judicial lawmak-
ing in copyright may have particular significance for the shaping of 
copyright law over time.  Consider the following four effects of judicial 
deference on the evolution of copyright law. 
First, because legislative and judicial institutions rely on different 
principles and procedures, legislative outcomes are often likely to be 
different from judicial ones.  While legislative drafting is a democratic 
process that ideally weighs various constituents’ interests against the 
social and economic purposes of the prospective rule, judicial rule-
making is more strongly beholden to its own prior judgments through 
judicial precedent. 
Second, and perhaps most salient, an emphasis on legislative 
rulemaking opens the door to greater influence by interest groups.  In 
a legislative framework, financially strong repeat players are able to 
91 Id. at 456 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 
(1972)).
92 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 431). 
93 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2-3 (2004). 
94 Clarisa Long, Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law (2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
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organize lobbying efforts more effectively, while judicial lawmaking, 
although not entirely immune to organized influence, is more insu-
lated from the organized action of interest groups.95  Indeed, there is 
some consensus among scholars that legislative decision making in 
copyright law disproportionately reflects the interests of those who are 
able to organize and lobby Congress most effectively—the entertain-
ment industry.  By this account, technological uncertainty might pro-
vide another explanation for the amount of legislative activity in copy-
right law and the consequences thereof. 
Third, judicial deference to legislative decision making in copy-
right law has an effect on the timing of lawmaking and, consequently, 
on the duration of legal uncertainty.  Deference to the legislature not 
only postpones decision making to a later point in time but also places 
the final resolution of a copyright issue in the lap of a slower rule-
maker.  Although both legislative and judicial decision making involve 
elaborate procedural safeguards, legislative decision making, by the 
nature of its democratic processes, involves more deliberation and, 
95 The rationale is that judges, especially those not subject to election, are influ-
enced less by considerations unrelated to the substance of the litigation.  Some com-
mentators have argued that judge-made law provides more efficient outcomes because 
inefficient legal decisions are more likely to induce repeat litigation than efficient out-
comes.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-52 (4th ed. 1992) 
(noting that common law doctrines “form a system for inducing people to behave effi-
ciently, not only in explicit markets but across the whole range of social interactions”); 
Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) 
(“[E]fficient rules may evolve from in-court settlement, thereby reducing the incentive 
for future litigation and increasing the probability that efficient rules will persist.”). But
see George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410 (1980) 
(contesting the ability of “the efficiency standard to explain all common law decisions” 
by considering the impact of settlements); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selec-
tion of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1984) (noting that Posner’s conclu-
sion on common law efficiency “requires the presumption that there are no cases involv-
ing alternate liability standards that were settled prior to appeal”).  Others have argued, 
however, that the comparative advantage of judge-made law is somewhat exaggerated.  
As with legislation, litigation can be manipulated by those with a greater financial inter-
est and long-standing experience.  As such, well-organized interest groups can more ef-
ficiently organize and pool litigation efforts, and they can also rely on prior experiences 
to make strategic decisions to settle disputes unlikely to result in favorable judicial 
precedents. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (discussing the advantage that 
repeat legal players have over “one-shotters”); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role 
of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 807 (1994) (“[T]he law is driven 
by the preferences of attorneys, not of litigants or of judges . . . .”); Todd J. Zywicki, The
Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law:  A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1551, 1553 (2003) (“[C]hanges in [the] institutional framework have made the com-
mon law more susceptible to rent-seeking pressures, which have undermined the com-
mon law’s pro-efficiency orientation.”). 
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ideally, the consultation of a wide range of stakeholders.  Legislative 
decision making might also be further delayed because of politically 
strategic reasons or because of difficulties in reaching a consensus be-
tween various stakeholders. 
Finally, it is important to note that, by prolonging legal uncertainty, 
judicial deference allows the behavioral effects discussed in the previous 
two Sections—users’ anticopyright norms’ becoming internalized and 
content holders’ resorting to self-help efforts—to be reinforced. 
III. UNCERTAINTY, DELAY, AND COPYRIGHT REFORM
Until now, this Article has made a modest attempt at explaining 
several recurring patterns in the evolution of copyright law.  In the 
remainder of this Article, I provide a number of normative reflections. 
A.  Evaluating Uncertainty and Delay 
Uncertainty and legal delay impose significant social costs.96  Some 
individuals may overestimate the legal constraints and forego activities 
that the state seeks to encourage, while others may underestimate the 
very same constraints and engage in undesirable behavior.  A lack of 
certainty may also induce copyright holders to engage in aggressive 
litigation strategies.97  For instance, “if the legal standard is uncertain, 
even actors who attempt to act ‘optimally’ in terms of overall social 
welfare will face some chance of being held liable because of the un-
predictability of the legal rule.”98  Risk-averse individuals may react by 
overcomplying—that is, by modifying their behavior beyond the point 
that is socially optimal.99  In the context of copyright law, overcompli-
96 Although I do not focus on this issue, legal uncertainty often has redistributive 
effects.  See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty 1 (Tel Aviv Univ. L. Sch. 
Faculty Papers, Paper No. 30, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/ 
fp/art30 (“[A] shift from a certainty legal regime to an uncertainty legal regime trans-
fers wealth from risk-averse parties to risk-neutral parties via the settlement.”).
97 Generally, by increasing potential disagreement over the outcome, greater un-
certainty reduces settlement rates.  See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58, at 265.  For a 
concise but insightful overview of the pernicious effect of uncertainty in the context of 
fair use, see R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm:  Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 429-31 (2005). 
98 Calfee & Craswell supra note 67, at 966. 
99 Examples in the literature on overcompliance induced by uncertain application 
of legal standards include commentary on labor regulation and tax compliance.  See
Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment:  A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consistent with the 
First Amendment, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591, 605 (2004) (“Risk-averse employers’ 
natural reaction to the vague limits of hostile environment is to over-compensate by 
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ance may have a chilling effect on creativity and authorship.  Artists 
will avoid incorporating copyrighted materials into their creative 
works even when incorporating those particular works could well be 
considered to be fair use and noninfringing.100
In other instances, uncertainty may undermine deterrence.  Un-
certain conditions loosen the connection between behavior and en-
forcement.  When the chance of getting caught for certain behavior 
becomes more remote, individuals may decide to take the underlying 
action.  In this sense, legal uncertainty may create the tipping point 
towards noncompliance in environments where there is a low prob-
ability of enforcement, as in the case of file sharing on peer-to-peer 
networks.101
Another potential cost of legal uncertainty is that, by enabling self-
serving dispositions,102 uncertainty drives copyright stakeholders into 
entrenched positions, making it more difficult to reach political con-
prohibiting words or conduct in the workplace that even come close to bordering on 
harassment.”); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 889 (1999) (“[L]egal indeterminacy creates liability risk, which risk-
averse fiduciaries are in a poor position to bear.  Exposing corporate fiduciaries to this 
risk makes their services more costly and less productive to shareholders.”); Kyle D. 
Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 373 (2005) 
(“Legal uncertainty can induce taxpayers, especially risk-averse taxpayers, to over-
comply with the law in various ways[,] . . . such as changing the structure of their trans-
actions, deciding not to engage in the transaction in question, or engaging the transac-
tion as planned but without taking advantage of the more favorable tax treatment to 
which they are arguably . . . entitled.”).  Note that, when overdeterrence is not a con-
cern, some authors have argued that uncertainty can be beneficial by inducing negoti-
ated solutions or by increasing efficiency in law enforcement efforts.  See, e.g., Tom 
Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law:  An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV.
443, 445 (2004) (“[U]ncertain sanctions may be preferable on efficiency grounds be-
cause they achieve more deterrence than certain sanctions of the same expected 
value.”); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of Limits and the Desired Distribution of 
Conducts, 32 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2000) (arguing that vague rules should be preferred 
over precise rules because they allow “customized compliance”); Linda K. Thomas, Child
Custody, Community And Autonomy:  The Ties That Bind?, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 645 (1997) (examining the vague “best interest” test used in determining child 
custody and how the standard causes more private ordering due to its uncertainty).
100 For example, documentary artists sometimes avoid including any copyrighted 
materials, even something as remote as a ringtone in the background of a scene.  See
Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, § 2, at 13. 
101 See Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
327, 334-35 (2006); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain 
Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986).  Evidence from cognitive psy-
chology suggests that low-risk events are generally either grossly overweighed or ne-
glected altogether.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 345 (1984). 
102 See supra Section II.A. 
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sensus in copyright issues.  This entrenchment can be a good or a bad 
thing, depending on one’s normative viewpoint on copyright law.  If 
one adheres to the view that copyright law disproportionally reflects 
the interests of copyright holders, the amplifying effect of uncertainty 
and delay on procopy norms and anticopyright social mobilization 
provides some counterweight to the political pressure exerted by copy-
right industries.  If, on the other hand, one takes the viewpoint of the 
entertainment industry that digital technology and file sharing are 
eroding the much-needed protection of copyright holders, then re-
ducing legal delay and uncertainty holds the promise of reducing the 
creation and internalization of self-serving social norms that disregard 
copyright infringements.  Reducing uncertainty and delay may also 
reduce costly protective measures, such as technological self-help, re-
medial litigation, and political rent-seeking expenditures.103
Finally, note that copyright holders and users of new technology 
sometimes strategically employ the conditions of uncertainty and de-
lay.  For instance, by settling cases, copyright owners can intentionally 
delay unfavorable legal decisions on new technology (for instance, if a 
finding of fair use with regard to a new technology is likely).  Simi-
larly, for representatives of new technologies, it can be useful to pro-
long periods of uncertainty, as those periods leave more time for users 
of new technology to begin to incorporate the new technology into 
their everyday lives and to entrench the norm of free content in the 
public’s perception.104
Overall then, the attendant costs and distortions that are induced 
by uncertainty and delay raise the question whether there are ways to 
reduce legal delay and uncertainty. 
B. Reducing Uncertainty and Delay 
To a certain degree, as this Article shows, uncertainty and delay 
are inevitable byproducts of a rapidly changing environment.105  The 
103 See supra Sections II.B-C. 
104 See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Cul-
ture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1880-84 (2009) (discussing the emergence of a norm of 
socially acceptable digital remixing of copyrighted content against a background of 
legal uncertainty). 
105 In fact, some scholars suggest that several factors in the legal process create a 
trend of increasing uncertainty in law over time.  See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 56, at 5 
(arguing that exceptions and nuances in judicial interpretation and specialized legisla-
tion create a trend towards greater complexity); Hirsch, supra note 58, at 1245-48 (argu-
ing that the conflicting objectives of lawmakers and courts obstruct the preference for 
1862 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1831
difficulty of anticipating coming and (ever-changing) technological 
trends complicates efforts to anticipate and quickly adopt copyright 
rules.  Similarly, detailed interpretations of existing rules are compli-
cated by the ever-changing nature of technological applications of 
copyrighted content.  There is a permanent risk that a premature le-
gal intervention will distort innovative activities.  While respectful of 
the inherent limitations of this endeavor, the remainder of this Part 
explores a number of institutional possibilities that might reduce the 
lag between innovation and legal certainty regarding the copyright 
status of a new technology.  What initiatives can one undertake to re-
duce uncertainty and delay? 
C. Copyright Rules or Standards? 
Many important aspects of copyright law are governed by stan-
dards rather than rules.106  Open-ended standards—fair use being the 
most important example—increase the amount of decision making at 
the judicial level.107  As such, copyright law’s use of standards may con-
greater certainty); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity:  Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures,
42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992) (arguing that legal professionals benefit from legal complexity). 
106 On the distinction between rules and standards, consider the following: 
Legal norms can be precise rules, which are blueprints for action and allow 
for mechanical decisions by judges and civil servants.  Alternatively, they can 
be vague, mission-oriented standards, which delegate decisions from the 
maker of the law to the judiciary and the administration.  Rules economize on 
the costs of adjudication and administration.  Standards economize on the 
costs of norm specification. 
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Rules Versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries:  Precise Legal 
Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-Income Countries, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
113, 113 (2006).  There is not a binary distinction between the two categories.  Rather, 
“[t]he difference between a rule and a standard is a matter of degree—the degree of 
precision.”  Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58, at 258.  See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
107 The statutory language governing fair use speaks in broad generalities: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
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tribute to the existing levels of legal delay and uncertainty.  Perhaps 
legal uncertainty and delay in copyright law can be reduced by em-
ploying more precise rules.  By reducing judicial discretion, potential 
ambiguities regarding the interpretation of existing rules, as they ap-
ply to new technologies, are narrowed.  This option would obviously 
reduce uncertainty as to the application of existing law to new tech-
nology.  By reducing the breadth of interpretative opportunities, pre-
cise rules also reduce the number of instances where delay is a factor.  
A number of recent proposals have advocated the use of bright-line 
rules to reduce uncertainty in copyright law, particularly with regard 
to the application of the fair use doctrine.108  For example, in an inter-
esting proposal, Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman suggest 
the creation of statutory minimal safe harbors in copyright law.109  Ex-
plicit statements of quantifiable permitted uses promote clear and 
predictable outcomes.110
While the insights of this Article favor the adoption of bright-line 
rules over open-ended standards, it is necessary to be mindful of the 
limits of taking copyright law in this direction.  To some degree, the 
unpredictable nature of technology simply necessitates open-ended 
standards in copyright law.111  There are at least two major arguments 
in favor of the adoption of standards in copyright law.  First, narrowly 
tailored rules are likely to increase error costs.  In an unpredictable, 
fast-changing technological landscape, new innovations often do not 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
108 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 295 (2004) (advocating clearer and nar-
rower lines demarcating the scope of protection for derivative works); Joseph P. Liu, 
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 151-52 (2004) (suggesting that the Copyright 
Office could be given the regulatory authority to promulgate rules and safe harbors).  
For an interesting account of the potential harms of fair use, see generally Rebecca 
Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
109 Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1489 (2007). 
110 See id. at 1511 (“We propose that for any literary work consisting of at least one 
hundred words, the lesser of fifteen percent or three hundred words may be copied 
without the permission of the copyright holder.”). 
111 Several scholars have argued that a flexible fair use analysis is necessary.  See,
e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999) 
(“The ‘muddy’ four-part balancing standard of fair use allows courts to reallocate what 
the market cannot.”); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007) 
(arguing that fair use is sensitive to context); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine:  A New 
Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
381, 435 (2005) (noting that a flexible fair use standard allows courts to adapt copy-
right protection to new innovations). 
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fit within existing concepts and definitions.  Consider, for instance, 
the introduction of the VCR.  While private recordings of cable TV 
shows plainly violated the exclusive right of copyright holders to make 
copies, the flexibility of the fair use standard enabled courts to ex-
empt the time-shifting features of VCR recorders.  By allowing the re-
cord function to be maintained on VCR players, the fair use exemp-
tion arguably boosted the success of VCR technology, which eventually 
created a very profitable secondary market in the sale of VHS tapes 
and rental movies.  The fact that VCR technology, with its dual-use 
character, eventually boosted the revenues of copyright holders 
plainly illustrates the highly unpredictable nature of the social and 
economic ramifications of technology. 
Second, flexible and open-ended standards are better suited to 
handle responses from technological innovators in regards to the le-
gal rules.  Technological developers are notoriously apt at what Leo 
Katz has termed legal “avoision.”112  Developers create technological 
applications that do not violate legal rules sensu strictu but that defeat 
the very purpose of those rules.  Whenever legislation or precedent 
provides specific language in the copyright statute that speaks to a 
new technology, technological innovators develop novel applications 
that exploit the gaps between technological possibilities and the self-
described boundaries of law.113  For example, when the Ninth Circuit 
in Napster established that copyright law implicates developers of cen-
tralized peer-to-peer technology by way of contributory liability, devel-
opers of file-sharing technology developed decentralized peer-to-peer 
file-sharing applications that were functionally equivalent to those ex-
plicitly prohibited in the Napster decision.114  By removing central 
servers, which gave rise to contributory liability on behalf of software 
developers, the developers successfully evaded the legal rule created 
in Napster.  Bright-line rules are thus easier for developers to circum-
112 LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 17-30 (1996) (contrasting “avoision” of ethical 
rules with “avoision” of law). 
113 Such interaction between law and technology can perhaps best be compared to 
the adaptation of creative tax consultants to the Internal Revenue Service.  See Tim Wu, 
When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 682 (2003) (“The programmer is not unlike 
the tax lawyer, exploiting differences between stated goals of the law, and its legal or 
practical limits.  He targets specific weaknesses in legal regimes . . . .”). 
114 See, e.g., Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litiga-
tion Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005) (“The [recording] in-
dustry’s victory in Napster was fleeting as publicity over the issue increased awareness of 
P2P technology and users flocked to decentralized networks like Grokster and KaZaa, 
making the tracking of P2P use more difficult.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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vent, as the developers can create new adaptive technology that does 
not fit within the existing rule.  The lack of analogy between the new 
technology and the existing legal rules will necessitate the creation of 
new substantive rules.  Open standards, of course, also create ambigu-
ity as to the applicability of the existing rule to a newly designed tech-
nology.  It can be argued, however, that when applying standards, 
such ambiguities can be resolved more easily by lower courts, while 
the adaptation of specific rules requires the creation of a new legal re-
gime—the latter being a more time-consuming process. 
D.  Copyright Courts or Administrative Agencies? 
Both delay and uncertainty are increased by the slow response of 
courts and are amplified further whenever courts defer decision mak-
ing to Congress.  This problem raises issues of comparative institutional 
design.  Perhaps there is some promise in delegating copyright govern-
ance to decision makers that are capable of acting more swiftly and ef-
fectively, thereby reducing overall levels of legal uncertainty and delay. 
How do we begin to assess the effects of judicial deference and 
congressional involvement?  Scholarly commentary generally deplores 
the expansion of copyright law that resulted from legislative action.  
This Article raises separate concerns related to the higher levels of 
uncertainty and delay that result from judicial deference.  In a legisla-
tive framework, copyright law is more likely to preserve the status quo 
because political compromise is so difficult to reach.  Indeed, the po-
litical landscape surrounding copyright law has reached a state of sig-
nificant polarization.  New technological advances have increased the 
stakes in copyright, enhancing the incentive to organize effectively.115
Moreover, the Internet enables interest groups that oppose the ex-
pansion of intellectual property rights to organize themselves at lower 
cost, creating competition with larger, better-funded interests.  The 
various positions taken by library associations, social-freedom groups, 
open-software movements, consumer-protection groups, artists’ rights 
groups, civil libertarians, the digital-freedom movement, the academic 
community, industry, and others makes political compromise harder 
115 The work of Lawrence Lessig in particular rests upon the notion that cyber-
space is a “fundamentally important changed circumstance” in the traditional copy-
right equation.  Because cyberspace makes the public domain so readily accessible, the 
stakes are raised to keep copyrighted material flowing into the public domain.  See
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments on Extension of Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2002, at C1. 
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to attain.  Thus, the more active political field may be slowing down 
legislative decision making in copyright.  Of course, legislative inertia 
may be preferable to those who disparage the expansionary direction 
of copyright law over the past century.  But, by extending uncertainty 
and delay, legislative inertia simply delays the resolution of new issues 
in copyright law.  This delay increases the familiar social costs de-
scribed above.116  Interestingly, legislative inertia also may have a self-
sustaining effect.  Given the enabling effects of uncertainty on anti-
copyright norms and self-help, legal inertia might lead to further po-
larization, making political compromise even harder to attain. 
The objective of reducing uncertainty and delay strengthens the 
case for regulatory approaches to copyright law.  There are a number 
of arguments that support delegating the administration of novel 
copyright issues to new regulatory bodies.  First, administrative bodies 
might be better suited to resolve politically entrenched stalemates in 
copyright.  In this sense, commentators have analogized the political 
and technological developments surrounding copyright law to devel-
opments in environmental issues since the 1960s.  Political theory 
suggests that “conflictual demand patterns” for new legislation, as ob-
served in copyright today, are more conducive to outcomes in which 
Congress delegates resolution of the problem to regulatory agen-
cies.117  If isolated from political pressure, regulatory agencies might 
be better positioned to balance the “competing core principles”118 in 
copyright law without discouraging the creation and dissemination of 
new technologies. 
Second, technocratic regulatory agencies might be better 
equipped to handle the growing complexity of technologies and the 
high rate of technological innovation.  As Peter Menell notes, “regu-
lating digital devices in the name of content protection hinders pro-
gress of digital technology.  Similarly, in environmental policy, legisla-
tors came to see that pollution controls could impair economic 
growth.”119  In this sense, regulation provides a means to balance com-
peting goals.  As such, regulatory bodies are often able to respond 
more proactively to issues involving the implementation of complex 
technological standards and to address copyright-related issues involv-
ing the application of the technology. 
116 See supra Section III.A. 
117 See Menell, supra note 31, at 195. 
118 Id. at 196. 
119 See id. at 197. 
2009 Technology and Uncertainty 1867
Third, some of the instruments available to regulators might be of 
particular assistance to the case at hand.  For instance, one possible in-
road to reducing uncertainty and delay could involve the issuing of 
agency guidelines that set an explicit understanding of new technology 
and align the expectations of the copyright implications involved.  Al-
though such guidelines might not contain any definite resolution of 
copyright issues, they might moderate the overextended reactions of 
copyright stakeholders that are amplified by legal uncertainty.  More-
over, guidelines could set default positions that might preempt some of 
the expectations of free use of new technologies that are a major source 
of the resentment that produces anticopyright norms whenever a new 
technology is found to be infringing at a later stage. 
Surely, regulatory involvement imposes costs and requires over-
sight.  From the perspective of reducing uncertainty and delay, how-
ever, there is ample reason to seriously consider recent proposals to 
adopt regulatory approaches as a more prevalent mode of governing 
copyright law in the future. 
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the relationship between technology and 
copyright law.  Specifically, it explores the formative effects of techno-
logical innovation on copyright law.  To construct this argument, I ex-
amine the formative roles of legal uncertainty and legal delay—two 
baseline characteristics of a rapidly changing and highly unpredict-
able technological landscape.  I argue that uncertainty and delay have 
an enabling effect on anticopyright sentiments, provoke a greater re-
liance on self-help efforts by content providers and users, and induce 
legislative involvement in the area of copyright law. 
Together, legal uncertainty and delay present interrelated com-
plications that inhibit the enforcement of copyright law:  anticopying 
technology never accomplishes perfect protection, social norms com-
plicate enforcement efforts, and legal adaptation is slow.  An analysis 
of these intrinsic constraints provides an improved understanding of 
the enforcement problems faced by copyright law. 
Copyright enforcement is, and always has been, imperfect.  Recent 
technological advancements, such as file-swapping technology and 
peer-to-peer networks, plainly highlight the practical limits to the en-
forcement of copyright law.  We should understand the actions of 
copyright stakeholders for what they are:  natural responses of actors 
facing legal uncertainty in a fast-changing technological environment.  
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Understanding these patterns can guard against exaggerated re-
sponses.  At the same time, insight into the dynamics of copyright 
change provides opportunities to make modest institutional im-
provements that may ameliorate some of the social costs imposed by 
the current copyright divide. 
